Abstract-Wireless personal area network (WPAN) is small-ranged network centered at an individual for interconnecting personal devices. For such a network, the bootstrapping mechanism with which the devices establish a secure group key is of critical importance. Most existing bootstrapping mechanisms require out-of-band channels and involve human interactions for authentication. In this paper, we aim to develop a fully automated bootstrapping mechanism with only in-band channels with approvable security. Toward this end, we designed an integrityguaranteed message (IGM) structure, a self-authenticated key agreement protocol, and a prescheduling mechanism in allusion to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for WPANs. The IGM structure guarantees that an adversary cannot modify the IGM message without being detected, thus protects the message integrity without the requirement of shared secrets between the sender and the receiver devices. The proposed self-authenticated key agreement protocol utilizes the IGM's integrity guaranteed property, works together with the prescheduling mechanism to achieve message self-authentication, thus protecting the secure bootstrapping process from the node impersonation attack and the man-in-themiddle attack without leveraging any out-of-band channels. We analyze the security performance of the proposed schemes, and show that they can be seamless interoperative with the existing IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
I. INTRODUCTION
A WIRELESS personal area network (WPAN) is a small-range wireless network for interconnecting devices around an individual person's living/working space [1] - [3] . With the increasing popularity of mobile smart devices, Internet of Things [4] , and smart home appliances, WPANs are entering and changing people's daily lives. As shown in Fig. 1 , a typical WPAN is composed of personal mobile devices such as smartphone, tablet, smartwatch, and smart home appliances such as smart TV, smart thermostat, etc. With all these devices connected together as a WPAN, people can have their physical activity data synchronized to their handheld devices (e.g., cell phones), and adjust the physical environment or living conditions (e.g., room temperature or switch TV channels) with great convenience.
However, in the wireless environment, a personal area network may not be "personal." Due to the open access nature of the wireless communications, an adversary may eavesdrop, intercept, or modify the data being transmitted [5] , and obtain unauthorized access to the WPAN. A WPAN usually carries traffic that deals with sensitive personal information that includes identity-related data, personal health, or medical information [6] , [7] . A variety of cryptographic solutions can be implemented to protect the WPAN, however, a cryptographic solution usually requires the WPAN devices sharing a secret key. Then how to have a shared secure key established among the WPAN devices becomes a challenging research issue [8] , [9] .
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol allows two individuals that have no prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure channel. Based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol, many key agreement protocols for a group of users have been developed [10] , [11] . Though these key agreement protocols are secured against eavesdroppers, they are vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack in which an adversary impersonates one or multiple parties, since the messages transmitted in these protocols are not authenticated. 2327 -4662 c 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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Secure bootstrapping, or device pairing, utilizes the outof-band channel (sometimes called human-assisted channel) to authenticate the users in the key agreement protocol, thus protecting the key establishment process from the man-in-themiddle attack. Many research efforts have been focused on developing different secure bootstrapping protocols to accommodate a variety of device user interfaces, and to reduce the amount of information required to be transmitted via the out-of-band channels. This paper is motivated by the fact that most of the existing secure device pairing protocols are designed for two parties, and require human interactions for authentication using out-ofband channels. In this paper, we design a secure bootstrapping scheme for a WPAN that consists of multiple devices. Our proposed scheme prevents the man-in-the-middle attack during the key agreement process without utilizing any out-of-band channels.
First, we design a new message structure, named integrity guaranteed message (IGM) structure for IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer. The IGM structure guarantees the message data payload cannot be modified by an adversary without being detected by the message receiver. This is achieved by adding a number of ON-OFF slots to an IEEE 802.15.4 physical frame. The ON-OFF slots represent a hash value of the data payload, and the number of ON slots is equal to the number of OFF slots. Any attempt to tamper the data payload will either result in the ON-OFF slots mismatching the hash value, or an unequal number of ON slots and OFF slots, thus being detected by the receiver. Then we develop a self-authenticated key agreement protocol for WPAN bootstrapping, which employs the integrity-guaranteed feature of an IGM and a prescheduling mechanism based on contention free guaranteed time slots (GTSs) of an IEEE 802.15.4 superframe mode to achieve message self-authentication, and is resistant to the node impersonation attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. The proposed IGM structure and secure bootstrapping scheme can interoperate with existing an IEEE 802.15.4 standard without modification to the standard or custom hardware.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. 1) We propose a novel IGM structure for an IEEE 802.15.4 physical frame, which guarantees the integrity of the message payload. 2) We developed a novel secure bootstrapping scheme for WPAN, which works with only in-band channels and prevents the man-in-the-middle attack. 3) We show how to configure an IEEE 802.15.4 parameters to accommodate the proposed IGM structure and secure bootstrapping scheme so that the proposed mechanism interoperate seamlessly with an IEEE 802.15.4. 4) We rigorously prove the security of the proposed scheme. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related works are briefly reviewed in Section II. Section III introduces some preliminaries. Section IV describes the network model and adversary model. The proposed secure bootstrapping scheme is presented in Section V. Section VI shows how to implement the proposed scheme in IEEE 802.15.4 standard, and Section VII analyzes the security performance. We conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Secure bootstrapping or device pairing for wireless devices has attracted many research efforts. Most of the existing works focus on the two-party scenario, and leverage an out-of-band channel to prevent the man-in-the-middle attack. There are mainly two parallel research tracks on this topic. One research track targets at optimizing the computation and communication cost of the pairing protocol, as well as reducing the number of bits required to be transmitted via the out-of-band channel [12] - [17] . The other research track focuses on utilizing different forms of out-of-band channels to improve the user-friendliness during the pairing process [18] - [22] .
Traditional out-of-band channels used in device pairing includes, but is not limited to, hardware port and extra cable [23] ; visual channels such as device screen [24] , [25] and LED blinking [26] ; and audio channels such as speaker and microphone [27] . There are also some new out-of-band channels emerging with the advanced smartphone features, for example, synchronized drawing [20] .
All the above mentioned research requires an out-of-band channel and involves human interactions to input or compare the authentication message.Čapkun et al. [28] proposed a novel message integrity protection technique named I-codes, which protects the integrity of a message payload by the ON-OFF slots pattern. The I-codes technique makes in-band secure pairing possible. Gollakota et al. [29] designed a tamper-evident announcement (TEA) message format which improves the performance and fixed the security vulnerability of the I-codes. The TEA message format is particularly designed for the IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi CSMA-CA mechanism, by introducing an exceptional long synchronization packet to guarantee an adversary cannot hide the fact that a TEA message is being transmitted. Based on TEA, the authors further proposed a pairing protocol named tamper-evident pairing (TEP). The TEP works together with the push button configuration in 802.11 to achieve secure device pairing for two individuals. This paper is inspired by the I-codes in [28] and the TEA in [29] . Different from the I-codes and the TEA, the IGM structure proposed in this paper is dedicated for IEEE 802.15.4 message, and has less communication overhead than the previously mentioned I-codes and TEA. We further explore the contention free access feature of GTSs in the superframe mode to design a secure bootstrapping scheme, in which the IGM is self-authenticated. The proposed secure bootstrapping achieves in-band secure pairing.
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. Cryptographic Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function h(·) is a one way function that takes a message of any length as input and produces a fixed length hash value. It has the following three properties. 1) Preimage Resistance: Given a hash value h, it is computationally infeasible to find a message m such that h = h(m).
Protocol 1: Group Key Agreement Protocol
Step 1:
Step 2: 
B. Group Key Agreement Protocol
A group key agreement protocol allows a group of n users to agree on a shared secret key without preshared knowledge. The established shared secret key can be then used as the symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt communications among the group members, or be used to generate other cryptographic keys for various application scenarios.
Most group key agreement protocols are generalizations of the two-party Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, by arranging group members in a circle or chain form, so each group member equally contributes to the established secret key. Considering the communication and computation efficiency, in this paper, we adopt the group key agreement protocol developed by Desmedt and Lange [10] . This protocol is provably secure, and requires only two rounds of communication, one exponentiation and roughly n multiplications for each group member. We show this protocol in Protocol 1. D i denotes the devices in the WPAN, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, n = 2m + a, a ∈ {0, 1}. Z * q is a multiplicative group of prime order q and generator g.
In the last step of the above protocol, each member computes K i as follows:
where i = 2j + k, k ∈ {0, 1}, and
By this group key agreement protocol, all group members yield the same key: The details of this protocol and the proof of its security can be found in [10] . The transmission of the key exchange parameters in this protocol are not authenticated, so Protocol 1 is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack.
C. Integrity Codě
Capkun et al. [28] proposed the integrity codes (I-codes) technique, which can protect the integrity of the message transmitted over the wireless channel, without the requirement of preshared secrets or mutual authentication material between the sender and the receiver. If a message is encoded using the I-codes, any violation to its integrity during the transmission can be detected by the receiver.
The I-codes exploit the physical characteristics of the wireless channel, and consist of three components: 1) unidirectional error-detection coding; 2) ON-OFF keying communication; and 3) the receiver's awareness of the sender's transmission range and the sender's start of transmission. For the ease of presentation, we use Fig. 2 as an example to explain why I-codes can protect the message integrity.
In Fig. 2 , the message 010 is first encoded using unidirectional error-detection coding ( Fig. 2 uses Manchester coding) into 011001, so in the encoded message there is an equal number of 1 and 0. Then the encoded message is transmitted by ON-OFF keying modulation, in which symbol 1 are represented by transmitting a random signal, symbol 0 are represented by keeping silence. An attacker can inject signal into the channel, thus flipping the symbol 0 into symbol 1. However, the attack is not able to remove the signal energy of the random signal representing symbol 1. When the integrity of the transmitted message is violated, the receiver will receive more symbol 1 than symbol 0, thus detects the presence of the attacker. It is important that the receiver is located within the transmission range of the sender, and is aware of that the sender has started its transmission. Otherwise, an adversary can impersonate the sender and tricks the receiver to accept his message as valid.
IV. PROBLEM MODEL
A. Network Model
The WPAN is usually composed of multiple personal or home devices. Typical examples of WPAN devices include personal mobile devices such as smartphone, laptop, smartwatch, tablet, fitness wristband, and can include smart household devices like smart temperature controller, household hazard detection system, and other smart home appliances. Each device in the WPAN is equipped with a chipset, and is capable of performing a certain level of cryptographic computations. One device, say the smartphone, works as the WPAN coordinator. The WPAN coordinator is equipped with user interfaces, and can interact with the WPAN user.
The WPAN devices may be located on the user's body, in the same room around the user, or in another room outside of the user's visibility range. All of the WPAN devices are located within the wireless transmission range of each other. The WPAN can be carried over wireless network technologies such as Bluetooth, Wireless USB, and ZigBee, however, in this paper, we assume the WPAN devices use an IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We assume that before the secure bootstrapping process, which is the main topic we study in this paper, the device discovery process has been performed, and the WPAN devices have established communication channels with each other.
B. Adversary Model
The adversary aims to get access to the generated group key without being detected. Here, we do not consider the denial of service attack that intends to prevent the group key from being established, since an adversary can always achieve this by continuously jamming the wireless channel. We assume during the secure bootstrapping process, all of the devices belonging to the WPAN are not compromised and can be fully trusted. Otherwise, it is essentially impossible to prevent a compromised device from accessing the group key, since the compromised device can participate in the secure bootstrapping process and misbehave afterward. Further, we assume that the user knows the exact number of devices in his WPAN. This assumption is reasonable, because in practice a user is aware of the number of devices he owns or the number of devices he wants to connect to his WPAN.
The adversary knows the details of the secure bootstrapping protocol, and the exact wireless channel the messages are transmitted on. So the adversary can eavesdrop all of the messages in the secure bootstrapping process. The adversary can also be active: he can transmit arbitrary message to arbitrary device(s), with arbitrary power at any time. This can be achieved with the help of the state-of-art radio technologies.
1) An adversary can impersonate legitimate device(s) and inject fake messages by using a directional antenna, without being noticed by the device(s) being impersonated. 2) An adversary can collide a concurrent transmission, resulting in a message collision at receiver's decoder. 3) An adversary can overwrite a concurrent transmission, by simultaneously transmitting a message at a significantly higher power (capture effect). During the group key agreement process, by using the previously mentioned attack vectors, an active adversary may be able to mount two types of attacks: 1) the node impersonation attack and 2) the man-in-the-middle attack. In the node impersonation attack, an adversary continuously jams a target device using a directional antenna, so that the target device will never have a chance to transmit, and the other WPAN devices will not even notice the jamming. Then the adversary impersonates the target device in the secure bootstrapping process. In the man-in-the-middle attack, the adversary impersonates one or multiple legitimate devices and trick the other devices in the group into believing that they are establishing a secret key with each other. An illustration of the man-in-the-middle attack is shown in Fig. 3 . In this scenario, the adversary divides the legitimate devices into two subgroups. During the group key agreement process, the adversary impersonates devices A and B in subgroup 2, and impersonates devices C-E in subgroup 1. For example, if the attacker impersonates device A, it should occupy multiple radios, when device A sends, the attacker uses one radio to receive and at the same time uses the other radio to jam the receiver. Same action applies for the returning message. By doing this, the adversary can participate in the key agreement process, derive a key K 1 with devices A and B, and a key K 2 with devices C-E without being noticed. The man-in-the-middle attacker differs from the node impersonation attack in the fact that, in the node impersonation attack the target device does not participate in the secure bootstrapping process, while in the man-in-the-middle attack, each device participates in a bootstrapping process with the adversary.
The difference between the adversary model considered in this paper and the Dolev-Yao threat model [30] lies in that the adversary cannot electromagnetically shield a device: the adversary may jam the communication channel, but he cannot disable the signal propagation of a transmitted message. 1 In fact, the adversary model considered in this paper is more practical than the Dolev-Yao model for a WPAN, because, in a WPAN application scenario, there is a negligible chance for an adversary to be able to physically access a WPAN device and put it in a Faraday cage without being caught by the WPAN user. In addition, we assume the adversary has bounded computational power, thus he cannot crack cryptographic hash functions. V. PROPOSED SCHEME The messages transmitted in the group key agreement protocol introduced in Protocol 1 are unauthenticated, so a group member cannot decide whether a message is from other legitimate group members or from an adversary. Protocol 1 is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack. The I-codes technique can guarantee the message integrity, thus achieve message authentication if the receiver knows it is located within the sender's transmission range and is aware of the fact that the sender is transmitting. Based on Protocol 1 and I-codes, a naive solution for WPAN bootstrapping would be having all messages in Protocol 1 transmitted using I-codes, in a prescheduled manner. However, I-codes requires double the information bits (if using unidirectional Manchester coding) of the original message, and only contains 1 bit of information in one symbol period. It is highly inefficient, and unnecessary, to transmit every message in the key agreement process using I-codes. Besides, the transmission prescheduling is not easy to achieve, especially in the presence of an active attacker.
In this section, we will present our design of a secure bootstrapping scheme for WPAN. The developed scheme consists of three main components: 1) an IGM structure; 2) a selfauthenticated group key agreement protocol utilizing IGM; and 3) a prescheduling mechanism for the message transmission during the self-authenticated key agreement protocol exchange phase. The IGM structure protects the message integrity without a preshared secret, and the self-authenticated group key agreement protocol works together with the prescheduling mechanism to protect the WPAN bootstrapping from node impersonation attack and the man-in-the-middle attack.
A. IGM Structure
IGM can guarantee that an adversary cannot tamper the payload of an IGM message without being detected, under the assumption that the receiver is located within the sender's transmission range. Fig. 4 shows an IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer frame structure of an IGM.
An IGM consists of two parts: 1) a physical layer packet frame and 2) a message integrity code represented by ON-OFF slots.
The first part of IGM is a regular an IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer data frame. The physical data frame contains the physical header, the media access control (MAC) header, and the data payload. The first three bits of the MAC header is the frame type field, which defines the message type contained in the data payload. The frame type value 000-011 are predefined by an IEEE 802.15.4 standard, while value 100-111 are reserved for user configuration. We use value 100-110 to indicate that the message being transmitted is using an IGM structure. Specifically, we use value 100, 101, and 110 to precisely indicate to the receiver that the IGM being transmitted is a regular data message, an acknowledgment, or an alarm message, respectively.
A short interframe spacing (SIFS) follows the transmission of the physical layer frame. In the SIFS period, the receiver decodes the physical frame and recognizes the frame type. The receiver then will be aware of the received packet is transmitted using the IGM structure, and the transmission of ON-OFF slots will start right after the SIFS. The ON-OFF slots represent the Manchester codes of the cryptographic hash value of the IGM message. By Manchester encoding, a bit 1 is encoded in 10, and a bit 0 is encoded into 01. So the number of ON slots is equal to the number of OFF slots in an IGM structure. The ON slot is realized by transmitting a random signal in a symbol period duration, and the OFF slot is realized by keeping silent in a symbol period duration. Now, we explain why the integrity of IGM is guaranteed. Upon receiving an IGM, the receiver first checks if the number of ON slots is equal to the number of OFF slots. If the numbers are equal, the receiver then derives the cryptographic hash value contained in the ON-OFF slots, and further checks if the cryptographic hash value matches the IGM message. The receiver accepts the IGM message as valid only if it simultaneously passes the slot balance check and the hash value check. If an adversary attempts to tamper the IGM message, he also has to modify the ON-OFF slots to match the hash value of the modified IGM message. An adversary is able to flip an OFF slot to ON slot by transmitting a signal in that slot duration; however, he cannot turn an ON slot off by canceling the random signal power. So any attempt to violate the integrity of the IGM message will either result in a mismatch of the cryptographic hash value, or an unequal number of ON-OFF slots, thus being detected by the receiver.
B. Self-Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol
With the help of IGM, we design a self-authenticated group key agreement protocol for WPAN, which is resistant to the man-in-the-middle attack. Distinguished from existing secure group bootstrapping protocols, our protocol does not require out-of-band channels for mutual authentication, i.e., it does not require human interactions during the bootstrapping process.
The proposed self-authenticated group key agreement protocol is presented in Protocol 2. " −→," "−→," and "=⇒" denote the message is transmitted using user interface, regular wireless channel, and IGM structure, respectively. U denotes the WPAN user, C denotes the WPAN coordinator, and D i denotes any device in the WPAN, including the WPAN coordinator. Z i , X i , and K i follows the computation in Protocol 1. h(·) is a cryptography hash function.
The proposed self-authenticated group key agreement protocol has three phases: 1) initialization; 2) key agreement; and 3) self-authentication.
1) Initialization Phase: In this phase, the user inputs to the WPAN coordinator the exact number of devices n in 
At the last step, the WPAN coordinator checks if the h(K i ) from each device matches with its own, and decides the success or failure of the secure bootstrapping process. Then the WPAN coordinator informs the result to the user through its user interface. In line 14 of Protocol 2, the hash value h(K i ) is transmitted using the IGM structure, so the integrity of h(K i ) can be guaranteed. If the WPAN coordinator knows the exact time at which the WPAN devices transmit their h(K i ), then each received h(K i ) is also authenticated, and this is achieved by the following prescheduling mechanism.
C. Prescheduling Mechanism
We resort to the beacon-enabled superframe mode of an IEEE 802.15.4 standard to preschedule the messages in Protocol 2 (details about an IEEE 802.15.4 can be found in Section VII). An 802.15.4 superframe contains a contention access period (CAP) and a contention free period (CFP) (see Fig. 5 ). All of the messages in Protocol 2 will be transmitted using the GTSs assigned by the WPAN coordinator without going through the CSMA-CA channel contention process. At the beginning of each superframe, the WPAN coordinator broadcasts a beacon to synchronize the WPAN devices and allocate the GTSs.
The utilization of superframe mode GTSs mechanism has two purposes. First, it schedules the transmission of key agreement parameters. So without the presence of an adversary, there should be no packet collision. Second, it enables the WPAN coordinator to know precisely the exact transmission time of each message in Protocol 2, thus, the authentication of the h(K i ) in line 14 can be achieved. To protect the secure bootstrapping process from node impersonation attack, we further regulate that if a WPAN device observes a packet collision or a continuous jamming signal, it sends an alarm message to the WPAN coordinator using the IGM structure.
The WPAN coordinator will detect the presence of an attacker and abort the secure bootstrapping process if observing any of these events: 1) the received IGM fails the integrity check; 2) it receives an alarm message; and 3) the comparison of h(K i ) fails.
The correctness of the proposed protocol is obvious: if there is no adversary, all of the IGM integrity checks, as well as the comparison of h(K i ) by the WPAN coordinator will pass. So any failure in the aforementioned detection mechanisms indicate the presence of an adversary. It is worth noting that the security performance of the proposed scheme does not rely on the hash function. Even if the attacker is able to crack the hash function, it still cannot successfully launch the min-in-themiddle attack, because the WPAN coordinator will compare the h(K) from the honest devices and detect the mismatching if their keys are not identical. The security of the proposed protocol will be analyzed in Section VI.
D. Device Joining/Key Updating
Sometimes the WPAN user may have a newly purchased device(s) joining the WPAN. Next, we show how the proposed secure bootstrapping scheme supports new device(s) joining. Since the above self-authenticated group key agreement protocol only works for n ≥ 4 parties, before we present the device(s) joining mechanism, we first introduce the two-party and the three-party versions of the proposed protocol.
In Protocols 3 and 4, the initialization phase and the selfauthentication phase are identical to Protocol 2, and the key agreement phase applies the traditional Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. Obviously, the correctness and security of Protocols 3 and 4 follows directly from Protocol 2.
Protocol 3: Two-Party Group Key Agreement Protocol
Initialization phase: same as Protocol 2; Key agreement phase:
: compute K 2 = Z r 2 1 = g r 1 r 2 ; Self-authentication phase: same as Protocol 2;
Protocol 4: Three-Party Group Key Agreement Protocol
where the indices are taken modulo 3 if necessary. Self-authentication phase: same as Protocol 2;
With Protocols 2-4, adding device(s) to the WPAN is easy. The WPAN coordinator and the new device(s) perform Protocols 2-4, depending on the number of new device(s), to derive a shared secret key K . Then the WPAN coordinator uses K to encrypt the WPAN group key K, and transmits E K (K) to the new device(s). The new device(s) can then decrypt E K (K) and get the WPAN group key K. With the device joining protocol available, the secure bootstrapping can be done in such a manner: the WPAN coordinator establishes a secure key with one of the WPAN device, and then treats the remaining devices as newly joined devices to add them to the WPAN one by one. However, taking the communication cost into consideration, it more efficient to run the proposed group key agreement protocol to have all the WPAN devices establishing a secure key at once.
VI. INTEROPERATING WITH IEEE 802.15.4
The WPAN can be carried over wireless network technologies such as Bluetooth, Wireless USB, and ZigBee. In this paper, we consider an IEEE 802.15.4 standard [32] as the lower level communication protocols for the WPAN devices. An IEEE 802.15.4 is a standard which specifies the physical layer and MAC for low-rate wireless WPAN. This section will discuss how the proposed IGM structure and the selfauthenticated key agreement protocol interoperate with an IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
The secure bootstrapping process will be performed using the beacon-enabled superframe mode defined in an IEEE 802.15.4 standard. The WPAN coordinator can activate the beacon-enabled mode, and define the superframe structure by setting relevant parameters. Fig. 5 shows an example of the superframe structure.
As shown in Fig. 5 , a superframe is bounded by network beacons, and is composed of an active portion and an optional inactive portion. All data transmission happens in the active portion, and the WPAN devices may enter a low-power (sleep) mode during the inactive portion. The active portion can be further broken down into a CAP and a CFP. During the active portion, all WPAN devices use slotted CSMA-CA to access the channel, however, during the inactive portion, the channel access is scheduled by the WPAN coordinator via GTSs.
The WPAN coordinator transmits a beacon message to indicate the start of a superframe. The beacon message serves as the WPAN synchronization frame, defines the length of each component in the superframe, and allocates the GTSs in the CFP to WPAN devices. The length of the superframe (also known as beacon interval, BI) and the length of its active portion (also known as superframe duration, SD) are defined as
where 0 ≤ SO ≤ BO ≤ 14 and aBaseSuperframeDuration = 960 symbols [33] . The active portion of the superframe will be divided into 16 superframe slots of equal length, and the duration of each superframe slot is aBaseSlotDuration × 2 SO , in which aBaseSlotDuration = 60 symbols. A minimum length of 440 symbols [34] must be reserved for CAP, and a maximum of seven GTSs can be allocated in each superframe. Each GTS must contain an integer number of superframe slots.
Suppose the WPAN devices communicate at 2.4 GHz frequency band, using offset quadrature phase shift keying (4 bits/symbol, 62.5 ksymbols/s). The proposed IGM structure is composed of a regular 802.15.4 physical frame, an SIFs, and a number of ON-OFF slots. The maximum length of an 802.15.4 physical frame is 133 bytes (266 symbols), including 6 bytes of PHY header and up to 127 bytes of PHY service data unit (PSDU, which includes MAC header plus data payload). The SIFs duration is 12 symbols in an IEEE 802.15.4. The number of ON-OFF slots is determined by the output length of the cryptographic hash function. Suppose we use a 128-bit hash value, the maximum length of an IGM structure is 266 + 12 + 128 × 2 = 534 symbols.
The IGM will be transmitted using GTSs. According to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, each GTS must contain an integer number of superframe slots, each superframe can support a maximum of seven GTSs, and each superframe is composed of 16 superframe slots. To maximize the ratio of CFP portion to CAP portion in one superframe, the WPAN coordinator will allocate seven GTSs in each superframe, and set the duration of each GTS to be two superframe slots. Recall that a superframe slot duration = aBaseSlotDuration × 2 SO , aBaseSlotDuration = 60 symbols. To accommodate one IGM structure in one GTS, the SO and BO will both be set to 3, resulting in a superframe slot duration equals 480 symbols and a GTS duration equals 960 symbols. With this setting, the duration of the CAP portion in each superframe will be 960 symbols, which satisfies the minimum requirement of 440 symbols. In this case, one superframe contains an active portion of 7680 symbols, and the superframe time duration, or the beacon interval is 122.88 ms at 62.5 k/s symbol rate.
Let us assume that the WPAN has exact seven devices, including the WPAN coordinator. When the WPAN secure bootstrapping process starts, the WPAN coordinator sends a beacon to enable the 802.15.4 superframe mode. In the very first superframe, the WPAN assigns device ID using GTS1, and the other devices reply with acknowledgments (lines 4 and 5 in Protocol 2) using GTS2-GTS7. Then the following two superframes are used for key agreement phase (lines 8 and 10 in Protocol 2). The self-authentication phase requires one more superframes for transmitting the authentication information (line 14 in Protocol 2). A total number of four superframes are employed for our proposed secure bootstrapping protocol. In general cases, when there are n WPAN devices, the total number of messages transmitted during the key agreement process will be 3n + (n/2) . With seven GTSs in each superframe, the total number of superframes required will be (3n + (n/2) /7) . In Fig. 6 we list the bootstrapping time for different WPAN size at different data rates defined in an IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
From Fig. 6 we can see that for a WPAN with 25 devices, the proposed secure bootstrapping process completes in 13 superframes, and only takes less than 1.6 s at the 250 kb/s data rate. The performance of the proposed protocol can be further tuned and optimized based on the security level requirements. For example, the transmission of a regular message not using an IGM structure (lines 8 and 10 in Protocol 2) can be fitted in smaller GTSs. And for users who expect fast bootstrapping time, they can use a truncated hash value and a smaller PSDU for key exchange parameters. For users who desire to generate a group key with a higher security level, the key exchange parameters in Protocol 2 may contain a large number of bits, so they may have to use multiple physical frames to transmit one key exchange parameter, and the WPAN coordinator will adjust the GTSs allocation accordingly. For WPAN composed of lowend, computational limited devices, the superframe structure may include an inactive portion to reserve some time between the message exchanges for the computation of key agreement parameters.
Compared to the traditional solutions, our proposed protocol neither requires the WPAN devices to have certain output interfaces such as screens or LED lights, nor involves human interactions to compare certain authentication information via out-of-band channels, and can interoperate with the existing an IEEE 802.15.4 without modifying the standard or employing extra hardware.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security performance of the proposed bootstrapping scheme. Through the analysis, we show that an adversary cannot modify an IGM message without being detected by the receiver, and the proposed secure bootstrapping scheme is secure against the node impersonation attack and the man-in-the-middle attack.
Lemma 1: An adversary cannot cancel the energy of an unpredictable random signal at the receiver side.
Proof: Let x(t) denote the transmitted signal, y(t) denote the adversary's signal, n(t) denote the white Gaussian noise, and h(t) denote the channel impulse function between the sender and receiver. Then the received signal at the receiver can be written as r(t) = h(t) * x(t) + y(t) + n(t). So the adversary need to generate a signal y(t) ≈ −h(t) * x(t) to cancel the signal energy at the receiver side. The transmitted signal x(t) is an unpredictable random signal, so the adversary cannot compute such a y(t) to cancel the energy receive by the receiver.
Theorem 1: Given that the receiver is located within the sender's transmission range, an adversary cannot modify the IGM content without being detected.
Proof: Since during the ON slots, the IGM sender transmits a random signal, by Lemma 1, an adversary cannot cancel the random signal at the receiver side. So an adversary cannot switch an ON slot to an OFF slot. According to our adversary model, an adversary is computational bounded and cannot crack a cryptographic hash function. So if the adversary modifies the content of an IGM without modifying the ON-OFF slots, according to the second preimage resistance property of the cryptographic hash function, the receiver will notice that the ON-OFF slots do not match the hash value of the IGM content, thus will detect the existence of an adversary. If the adversary modifies the content and the ON-OFF slots, since he cannot switch an ON-slot to an OFF-slot, the receiver will notice that the number of ON-slots does not equal to the number of OFF-slots, thus will detect the existence of an adversary.
Theorem 2: In the beacon-enabled superframe mode of an IEEE 802.15.4, the proposed bootstrapping protocol is secure against node impersonation attack.
Proof: The proposed secure bootstrapping protocol works in the beacon-enabled superframe mode, so all the communication are transmitted in the contention free GTSs scheduled by the WPAN coordinator. A WPAN device will transmit its message in the GTS assigned to it in each superframe, without going through the CSMA-CA process. If an adversary jams the communication channel of a target device using a directional antenna, the target device will then not be able to decode the received message, thus observes a packet collision and is aware of the presence of the adversary. According to the proposed scheme, upon observing a packet collision, the target will send an alarm message using IGM to the WPAN coordinator. By Theorem 1, the adversary cannot modify the IGM without being noticed. So the WPAN coordinator will either receive the original alarm IGM, or notice that the received IGM fails the integrity check. In both cases, the WPAN coordinator will detect the presence of the adversary and abort the secure bootstrapping process.
Theorem 3: In the beacon-enabled superframe mode of IEEE 802.15.4, the proposed the proposed secure bootstrapping protocol is secure against the man-in-the-middle attack.
Proof: To launch the man-in-the-middle attack, the adversary divides the WPAN into two subgroups, and in each subgroup, he impersonates the devices belong to the other subgroup. Without loss of generality, let us assume the WPAN coordinator is in subgroup 1. After the key agreement phase, the adversary shall establish a K with subgroup 1 and a K with subgroup 2.
If K = K , according to the collision resistance property of the cryptographic function, the probability that h(K) = h(K ) is negligible. In the self-authentication phase, the devices in subgroup 2 will transmit to the WPAN coordinator h(K ) using the IGM structure. By Theorem 1, the adversary cannot modify the transmitted IGM without being detected, so the WPAN coordinator will find the mismatch of h(K) and h(K ), thus detects the presence of the adversary.
The only chance for the adversary successfully launching the man-in-the-middle attack would be having K = K . He can only achieve this by relaying the key exchange parameters between the two subgroups. In this case, the behavior of the adversary is equivalent to a passive eavesdropper. However, the group key agreement protocol we use is immune to a passive eavesdropper [10] .
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the secure bootstrapping problem for WPAN, in which a group of WPAN devices establish a shared secret key without preshared knowledge. We proposed an IGM structure, which guarantees that an adversary cannot modify the messages' data payload without being noticed. A secure bootstrapping protocol utilizing IGM is then presented, which is resistant to the node impersonation attack and the manin-the-middle attack. The proposed scheme works in-band and does not involve human efforts. We analyzed the security performance of the proposed scheme, and showed they can smoothly interoperate with the existing IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
